The basis of the military system in the Ulus Dzhuchi was a hierarchically organized system of Tatar clans’ possessions. Its characteristic feature was the intertwining of military and administrative system. Such military-administrative system was traditional for the Turkic-Mongolian statehood…
Khan Uzbek “paid attention to the affairs of his state only in their totality, without going into the details of all circumstances. He was content with what was reported to him and did not consider various particulars regarding levying and spending”. In other words, we can say that although formally the khan was the commander-in-chief, as a rule, he did not take part in military actions. Even when it was reported that the khan went on a campaign together with the army, it did not always mean that he directly led the troops. Sometimes, however, when the khan took command, it only led to military disaster, as was the case when in 1285 and 1286-87, the khan’s command of Tula-Buga actually failed. Tula-Buga actually failed in a military campaign against Hungary and Poland.
Khan was only formally the commander-in-chief of the Golden Horde troops, the actual any military action was led by ulug karachi-beg.
The actual commander-in-chief was ulug karachi-beg (beklaribek). Egyptian sultans addressed him in the official interstate correspondence as “the champion of warriors and fighters for the faith, the leader of the troops, the leader of the army, the accomplice of kings and sultans, the sword of the lord of the faithful”, clearly emphasizing the military component of his functions and powers. It is the bearers of this title and position that we see, as a rule, at the head of the Golden Horde troops during major military campaigns. Under Berke Khan and his descendants such a commander was Nogai, under Uzbek — Kutlug-Timur, in the period of the “great confusion” — Mamai, and at the beginning of the XIV century — Idegei. It was they who spent their lives in campaigns and battles, planning and leading troops on the battlefield, often exposing their lives to dangers and getting wounded. For example, during a battle with Hulaguid troops in 1256, Nogai was wounded in the head and lost one eye.
“Khan Mamai”. Painting by V. Matorin from the collection of the Museum-Reserve “Kulikovo Field”. Mamai in fact Khan was not
Warrior=elite
The very military organization of the Ulus Dzhuchi had a feudal character. Its characteristic feature was that all representatives of Tatar clans were the social top of the Golden Horde society. They, as a rule, led a semi-nomadic way of life, and their everyday life differed little from that of the taxpayers. But they had one major privilege that distinguished them from the rest of the population — they had the right to bear arms and participate in military campaigns. It was the attitude to service that made this or that person in the Golden Horde a representative of the military nobility. There was no other ethno-social structure and self-identification outside of clans and military service.
Within the clans there was a significant class differentiation, determining the place of each in the social hierarchy and in the military organization. However, all of them had one thing in common — they were included in the clan system by virtue of their origin, merits and kinship ties and could become a military-service class. The structure of the Tatar military-serving estate is well represented in the labels of the XIV-XV centuries. The top of the society and, accordingly, the highest military command were the oglans of the right and left wings — sultans from the Juchi family, followed by ulusbeks and daruga-beks, and after them beks (emirs) of thousands, hundreds and tens.
In general, the analysis of labels makes it possible to reconstruct the military system of Ulus Dzhuchi as a hierarchically organized structure, built on the tens system — from tens to tumen (i.e. ten-thousand corps), under the command of beks, emirs, ulusbeks and oglans. The structure of troop management is described by Marco Polo, who was himself an official in the Yuan Empire:
“When the Tatar tsar goes to war, he takes with him a hundred thousand men on horseback and arranges such an order: he puts a foreman over ten men, another over a hundred, another over a thousand, and another over ten thousand; he is related only with ten men, and the foreman over ten thousand is related also with ten men, who over a thousand is placed, also with ten, who over a hundred, also with ten … When the sovereign of a hundred thousand wishes to send someone somewhere, he orders the foreman over ten thousand to give him a thousand, and he orders the thousandaire to put his part, the thousandaire to the centurion, the centurion orders the tenth man to put his part to the one who is over ten thousand; everyone, as much as he should give, gives so much. The order is obeyed better than anywhere else in the world. One hundred thousand, you know, are called here (at Potier, tug — banner), ten thousand toman, a thousand mines, a hundred yuz, a dozen he.”
This is a general scheme of military-administrative division, which united contingents only approximately corresponding to tens, hundreds and thousands. In reality, such units could be larger or smaller than the stated number.
On the battlefield — with a servant
How the formation of military contingents took place in practice, who gathered the troops — we can only assume. Perhaps, the heads of clans, being also ulusbeks, assembled mixed contingents, which consisted of their personal vassals and the militia of other beks attached to his corps. It is not excluded that in practice there was a certain rotation of clans and their possessions and, accordingly, the composition of troops changed.
The hierarchy of military service and its gradual differentiation by income level could not but affect and affected the evolution of the armament complex. In the early period of the conquest, judging by archaeological materials, it was apparently quite homogeneous, as victorious wars contributed to the capture and concentration of prestigious armament from the veterans of Batu’s campaigns. The noble warriors were definitely distinguished by a specific set of belts, costume details and bowls of precious metals. However, already at the end of the XIII-XIV centuries there was a gradual division of the armament complex. The social upper classes of the army, as in other countries of medieval Eurasia, were distinguished by the use of protective armor (metal armor, helmets, armlets, shields, and sometimes horse armor) and prestigious types of weapons (sabers, spears, saadach sets, etc.). Characteristically, it was often those buried with such a complex of armament who rested in mausoleums or semi-subterranean tombs of the sagan type. The rest of the army was armed with remote combat weapons and universal types of melee weapons (spears, axes, knives). In this regard, it seems that the social division reflected to a large extent the gradation of the troops of the Ulus Dzhuchi into mounted lathiers — beks and emirs, and simple mounted archers — batyrs and Cossacks.
Gold belt set with carnelian inserts, Golden Horde, XIV — first half of XV centuries. Found as part of the Simferopol hoard
At the same time, it should be emphasized that there was a practice when during military campaigns the commander armed a certain number of his soldiers at his own expense. Obviously, in the Ulus Juchi, where there was a developed craft production and in the hands of the clan aristocracy were concentrated huge funds, such a practice was developed. Such military servants, most likely, were paid for their service and, obviously, originating from the same clan as the bek, formed the basis of his military contingent, the backbone of the territorial militia. In addition to the warriors themselves, the troops necessarily had servants. According to some information, there were at least two servants for one warrior-rider.