The Mongols defeated the main Jin army and cleared the way to one of the capitals. In the fall of 1211, Genghis Khan besieged Zhongdu and sent mobile units to sack the surrounding settlements.
“It is better to leave in the fall” — Napoleon Bonaparte.
Having finished with looting, the great conqueror realized that the fortified city could not be taken at a gallop, so he decided to wait out the winter somewhere away from enemy arrows and siege shells. In mid-November 1211 Genghis Khan lifted the siege and set off with his troops to the north, taking with him horses that belonged to the Jin state.
The Mongols settled for wintering in the border territories. Meanwhile, in the Jin Empire activated centrifugal tendencies — a common phenomenon in states with unstable vertical power. Not only was the emperor left without troops on the borders, but the court was not all turbulent.
All over Northern China now and then broke out pockets of rebellion. Both noble princes and ordinary peasants fought against the central government.
The Jin Empire was a multinational state, so some areas, feeling the weakening of the central government, raised their heads. Some vassals openly opposed the emperor, declaring independence, and some preferred to join Genghis Khan’s army, hoping to maintain autonomy, cooperating with the nomads.
While at the court of Emperor Wanyang Yongji was going to hell, the Mongols wasted no time. In the middle of the winter of 1211-1212, they closely followed the political intrigues developing in the Jin Empire. Genghis Khan realized that the chaos caused by his raids — a convenient moment to strike again.
The victorious march of the Mongol army resonated with the rapid heartbeat of ordinary Chinese.
In the spring of 1212, with the onset of warm weather, the Mongol horde began moving south again. Once again, Emperor Wanyang Yongji found himself in an extreme predicament. His attempts to consolidate power and restore the fighting capacity of the collapsed army were unsuccessful. In conditions of political instability, against the background of the lack of centralized management, the newly assembled troops could not effectively coordinate their actions, which led to the inability to provide proper resistance to the nomads.
In early May 1212, the Mongol army was again “on the other side” of the Great Wall. Remembering last year’s triumph, Genghis Khan acted the same way as in the previous campaign. Small detachments scattered across the fertile lands of Jin and plundered settlements, and the main army besieged one city after another.
Mongol shamans knew how to make it rain. Rain of arrows.
In the campaign of 1212 Mongolian tactics remained unchanged — sudden raids on outposts created chaos in the ranks of the defenders. Genghis Khan often concentrated serious forces in those directions where the enemy least expected an attack. An integral part of the Mongol attack was the blockade of logistical arteries. By blocking important trade and food routes, the Mongols not only left the enemy without provisions, but also put him in ignorance, leaving him without news and orders from the capital.
At the same time, the Mongols continued to support separatist sentiments among local elites. Vassal princes, seeing the strength and determination of the Mongol army, came over to the side of Genghis Khan, promising him loyalty in exchange for protection and preservation of their authority in the captured territories. This policy allowed the Mongols to form an impressive political alliance in the heart of the Jin Empire.
As the Mongol invasion progressed, more and more Chinese feudal lords defected to the “victor’s” side.
But even despite the overwhelming military power of the nomadic army and the active support of Jin collaborators, in the campaign of 1212 Genghis Khan could not take a single fortified city.
The strong walls of the Tszintsevs were indifferent to how many horsemen the enemy has. In addition, it so happened that Northern China had the most powerful artillery of that time, so the Mongols, who had no siege guns, had to keep at a distance when blockading large cities, hoping that the town governor would lose his nerve and lay down his arms before the forces of nomads.
What was it you said? The middle capital in three days? Yeah, sure.
In the campaign of 1212 the Mongols did not manage to take any major city, but the nerves of the Emperor Genghis Khan frayed significantly. Even then, the nomads knew what investment meant. Destroying settlements and burning fields in 1212, the great conqueror realized that in the next campaign it will be much easier for him, as the Jinians will have fewer resources. Moreover, many princes openly supported the nomads, and accordingly, after the departure of the Mongols Wanyang Yongji will have to fight with traitors and will not have time to prepare properly for the next meeting.