In the middle of the 13th century, the peak of Mongol strength was reached, and no nation could stand up to the nomads militarily. The Mongol army was better in everything; mobility, organization and command structure, quality of generals, intelligence, training, tactical prowess.
Although, many people managed to repel the Mongols, but the Vietnamese used guerrilla warfare in their jungles; the Japanese were helped by logistical problems and typhoons; the Indians were protected by a difficult climate — even Genghis Khan himself stood with an army on the doorstep of India, but retreated. As for the field battle, especially the mounted one, at that time few people could overcome the Mongolian force and repeat the success time after time.
Only the Egyptian Mamluks, who from 1260 to 1313 met the Mongols in seven major battles and were defeated only once, managed to do so. How did they manage to surpass the Mongols, whose cavalry was considered the best in the world?
The Mamluks and Gulams had existed in the east for centuries. By the time the Mongols arrived, they made up the bulk of the army in many states in the Islamic east. Where the sovereign was rich enough and had reason not to trust his own army if it was subordinate to his clan leaders, he created a guard of slave warriors. They were strangers, without any social connections, and therefore supported their master unconditionally, as long as he paid them.
However, over time, these guards formed a closed corporation, which also began to influence political processes. This was the case in the first centuries of the Arab Caliphate and in Central Asia, where the Ghaznavid dynasty was of Gulam origin.
In Egypt, such processes gained critical mass just before the arrival of the Mongols. If the previous rulers could control their army thinly or poorly, the Kurdish royal family of Ayyubids eventually ceased to cope with it. And as a result, Mamluk Aybek in 1250 became the husband of the widow of the legitimate sultan and guardian of his minor heir.
But then they were completely removed from power, and the throne began to be occupied by Mamluk leaders. By the time of the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, there were three of them. Although the new regime had not yet had time to stabilize, this could not be said of the Islamic world as a whole, which finally realized the Mongol danger. According to Arab writers of the time, Egypt came to be seen as the last Muslim bastion against the Mongol hordes.
Nevertheless, victory in the first clash was largely a matter of chance. By the time of the Middle East campaign of 1256-1260s, the Mongols had already controlled Iran, the Caucasus and the Seljuks of Rum, so the main painful actions were against the Arab countries. By virtue of its geographical position, Egypt was the last in line, and here it was unspeakably lucky: the great Khan Munke died, and his own brother Hulagu withdrew his troops to participate in the election of a new Mongol emperor.
Only a small observation corps was left in Syria, nevertheless its commander Kitbuga believed in himself. But the Mamluks attacked the enemy with 2-3 times more troops and used cunning to surround the Mongols. As a result, they failed to show their best qualities and were forced to go to close combat. And then they were easily defeated.
The battle of Ain Jalut might have seemed like a joke, for the Mongols had already suffered defeats and each time they struck again, after which their triumphal march continued. But in this case, their invasion was indeed repulsed, and in the following decades, the Mamluks even conquered Syria.
But at the expense of what they defeated the Mongols and even had an advantage over them in mounted combat?
The fact is that in the Levant, due to its climate and geographical position, the Mongol army was deprived of two important advantages: mobility in the theater of war, and therefore — the factor of surprise; and the ability to maneuver directly on the battlefield.
The desert and a number of mountain ranges deprive the choice of direction for attack. As a result, the defending side knows exactly where it will happen, it only needs not to miss the very moment of attack. There is no vastness here, and valley to valley is connected by a narrow mountain gorge. The plains themselves are not big enough to use the old nomadic tactics of hit and run, you have to fight head-on.
In addition, Syria and Palestine have no steppe, and therefore no fodder for Mongol horses, which cannot be brought here in large numbers. War horses in the Middle East and around the world were fed with grain, but the attempt to move on them gave the Egyptians the opportunity to wage a war of attrition and use scorched earth tactics — when attacking, they took away people and destroyed crops. In addition, the Mongols traditionally did not shoe the hooves of their horses, but here they were treading not on soft soil, but on stones and sand. In the future, they still began to shoe them, but the first, and probably the second campaign, the attackers failed because of this.