After Jochi’s death, his two sons Batu and Orda-edgen began to rule in the ulus, which actually divided Jochi’s possessions among themselves. The division of possessions between Batu and Orda-egen was supposed to weaken regional power in accordance with the principle of «Divide and rule». After the death of Genghis Khan and the accession of Ogedei to the khan’s throne in 1229, the central government continued its efforts to weaken the power of the rulers of the Jochi ulus. In 1229, Ogedei sent a 30,000-strong army to the western borders of the Jochi ulus with the task of conquering the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Bashkirs. At the head of the army was a close relative of Genghis Khan, Kuki Kiyat (Kokoshay) and commander Subotei, who fought in this territory in 1221-1223. The detachment consisted of two tumens of the Mongol army (tumen – ten thousandth detachment) and one combined tumen: «thousands from the provinces of Merkit, Naiman, Kirey, Kangly, Kipchak.»
On the spot, Batu developed good relations with Kuki kiyat and Subotei. As a result, Shiban, the son of Jochi, was given to Burultai kiyat (the son or nephew of Kuki Kiyat) to be raised, which strengthened the ties of this detachment with the Jochi ulus. As a result, after the death of Kuki Kiyat, Burultai (Burundai, Boraltai) from the Kiyat clan and Subotai from the Urianhai clan were at the head of the detachment. From 1229 to 1235, this detachment failed to achieve significant military successes.
Ogedei’s advisers invented a formula: «eldest sons», who were to be sent to the frontiers of the empire for conquests. If we assume that, on average, a yurt supplied two men to the army, then they could be either two sons of the owner of the yurt, or a father and an older son. To fulfill the two precepts of Genghis Khan, the conquest of the western lands and the struggle against Jalal ad-Din, all uluses had to allocate their eldest sons. All this was highlighted by the name of Genghis Khan, and it is clear that no ulus owner could go against tradition, besides, the de jure division of the ulus was not violated, no one took away yurts and ulus from anyone, although the de facto power of each ulus was weakened by the removal of half of its men («elders sons») for western campaigns. The main purpose of sending these three detachments was to strengthen the central government, because all three detachments were teams from various uluses and reported directly to the military leaders appointed by the kagan. In 1229, Subotei encountered the Kipchak Bachman, because according to Yuan Shi, during the western campaign of 1235, Bachman, hearing only the name of Subotei, became timid and fled. Apparently, in 1229, Subotei achieved considerable success in the fight against the Kipchaks, but since 1230, the detachment of Kuki and Subotei could not achieve much success, getting bogged down in the fight against the Bulgars and Bashkirs [1].
Batu, along with his relatives and cousins, participated in the conquest campaign to the west in 1236-1242. The main purpose of this campaign was to implement the «covenant of Genghis Khan» on the conquest of the western part of the Eurasian steppe and the subjugation of Eastern European states. The Mongols themselves called the campaign Kipchak, as the main purpose of the campaign was to conquer the Kipchaks. Before each campaign to a certain state, the rulers of these states were required to recognize themselves as vassals of the Mongol Empire and, as a sign of their submission, had to regularly pay tribute and supply people as auxiliary military contingents. In return, the rulers of these states retained their power on their territory and received almost complete freedom in the internal affairs of their state. They could also count on military support in the event of a military conflict with a state that was not subordinate to the Mongol Empire.
In 1235, new troops of 30-35 thousand people were sent by Ogedei to help the 30,000-strong detachment of Subotei and Burultai. As a result, 60-65 thousand troops led by Subotei, Batu and Burultai moved to conquer the Kipchaks and Eastern Europe. Speaking about the list of participants, we can fully agree with the opinion of R. Pochekaev about the non-participation in the campaign of Kaidu and Kodan, the son of Ogedei [2]. The Qutan mentioned by Rashid al-Din is not Kodan, the son of Ogedei, but, most likely, is the well-known Kingitai Qutan-noyon (Hunan) from the Kingit (Geniges) tribe [3], whom Genghis Khan handed over to Jochi as an inheritance [4]. Kutan and Sonkur, Jochi’s son, apparently remained in the rear and, according to Rashid al-Din, were able to defeat the rebellious Kipchaks in battle [5]. According to Rashid al-Din, the princes and emirs set out on a campaign in February-March 1236, and in the autumn joined forces with the Batu, Horde, Shiban and Tangut detachments. It is worth noting here that Rashid al-Din combined his authentic information with the story of Juveini [6], and therefore the narrative of the battle with the Hungarians was ahead of the entire description of the campaign. Speaking about the war of Mengu, Buchek with Kipchak Bachman and Asa Kachir-ukule, Rashid al-Din writes: «He (Mengu) spent that summer there, and after that in takiku-il, in the year of the chicken, corresponding to the year of the 634 Hijri (04.09.1236-08/23/1237) Batu, Horde, Berke, Kadan, The Buris and Kulkan engaged in a war with the Moksha, Burtas and Arjans (Erzya) and took possession of them in a short time.» Here it can be assumed that the actions of Mengu against Bachman went in parallel with the actions of Batu against the above-mentioned three peoples (Mordvins, Erzya, Burtasi), since in the first story there are Mengu and Bucek, but no other Genghisids, while in the second campaign, on the contrary, there are many Genghisids, but no Mengu and Bucek. It is also worth noting that the group of Mengu and Bucek was equal to about 20,000 soldiers (100 people on 200 ships).
V.P. Kargalov dated the time of the action against Bachman as spring-autumn 1237 [7]. R.P. Khrapachevsky believed that the actions against Bachman took place in 1238-1239 [8], but it is worth noting that in 1238 Mengu was on a campaign against the Circassians, and Bucek was on a campaign in the Crimea, at the end of 1239 both besieged Magas (Minkas). Myskov E.P. believes that Bachman’s rebellion was not earlier than the spring of 1238 or in 1240 [8]. Pochekaev R.Yu. believed that Bachman’s capture took place after the first Russian campaign [10].
We assume that Bachman’s capture took place in the spring and summer of 1237, in 1236 it could not take place, since the Mongol army had not yet reached the Volga. According to Yuan Shi: «In the year of Yi Wei (01/21/1235-02/08/1236), Taizong (Ogedei) ordered Zhuwan Batu to march West against Bachman. Bachman found out about Tsubodai’s arrival, became very timid and fled to the middle of the sea» [11]. It is quite possible that after coming to the West, Mengu and Bucek were specifically sent to capture Bachman. The importance of this person is confirmed by Ogedei’s personal order to «catch Bachman.» So the princes could hardly delay the capture of such an important enemy. It is worth noting here that around the same time, Mengu and his brother conquered the Kipchaks under the leadership of Hulusuman (Inalchuk Kairkhan’s son).
During the Western Campaign of 1235-1243, at its very beginning, Mengu had already begun to smash the outskirts of Hulusuman’s possessions, who was forced to send envoys to Mengu in order to negotiate voluntary submission to the Mongols. Banducha submitted to Meng. Later, Banducha, as part of the Mengu troops, took part in the storming of Magas (the capital of the Alans). It is worth noting that Pellio also identified Inasy and Inalchuk (Terken-khatun’s cousin and the initiator of the Otrar incident), which Pilipchuk Ya.V. agreed with in principle. Thus, it is worth noting that Tutuk was the great-grandson of Inalchuk Kairkhan, who died in Otrar, and Inalchuk’s son and grandson (Hulusuman and Banducha) recognized Mongol citizenship only around 1236 (the time of the beginning of the Western Campaign) under the pressure of Mengu’s troops. Before that, Inalchuk’s children and grandchildren, remembering the execution of their father by the Mongols, put up armed resistance, surrendering only under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, more than 15 years after Inalchuk’s death. An attempt by Akhinzhanov S.M. It seems to us poorly reasoned to identify Hulusuman and Bachman, but at the same time it can be assumed that Bachman was a relative of Hulusuman. Inalchuk (Inasy), in our opinion, did not belong to the Kun family. As Akhinzhanov S.M. notes, Terken-khatun, Inalchuk’s cousin (their fathers were brothers), came from the Bayaut tribe (according to Nasavi). And Tutuk’s granddaughter, the wife of Tug-Temur, the last Mongol emperor from the Yuan dynasty, also came from the Bayaut tribe of Kipchak (according to Pelliot P. and Yuan Shi). Considering that Inasy, Tutuk’s great-grandfather, was a cousin of Terken-Khatun, we can say that they both belonged to the Bayaut clan, the Kipchak tribe.
According to Rashid al-Din, in the autumn of 1237, the princes organized a kurultai, at which they decided to go against the Russians [12].
After the first campaign against the Russians, the Mongols left and took up other matters: in the autumn of 1238, Mengu and Kadan attacked the Circassians and killed their leader Tukar. In the same year, 1238, Berke went on a campaign against the Kipchaks and captured several military leaders. Shiban, Bucek, and Buri marched into the Crimea and captured Tatkara from the Chinchakan tribe. R. Khrapachevsky dates the campaign to the Crimea in 1239 (mistakenly referring to Rashid al-Din). According to certain data, the Mongols captured Surozh (Sudak) on December 26, 1239 [13]. It is quite possible that Shiban and Bucek were in Crimea until the end of December 1239. One more point should be noted here: in the year of the Dog, which was 635 (08/31/1237-08/20/1238), Berke went on a campaign against the Kipchaks and captured Arjumak, Kuranbas, Kaparan, and the Golden Eagle commanders. Under the name of Golden Eagle, Kotyan Khan, the ruler of the western Kipchaks, is hiding. Apparently, the recording of Berkuti (Yerkuti) is a distorted recording of Er-Kotyan, where Er is an epithet (courageous). Pilipchuk Ya.V. dates the resettlement of the Kipchaks to Hungary to Easter 1239 (March-April 1239). Matvey Parissky and Roger Bacon say that Kotyan ended up in Hungary after being defeated by the Mongols, which Pilipchuk Ya.V. agrees with. Thus, it can be assumed that Berke defeated Kotyan’s troops, captured his three military leaders Arjumak, Kuranbas and Kaparan, after which Kotyan was forced to retreat to Hungary.
At the end of 1239 (the year of the boar), Guyuk, Mengu, Kadan and Buri, who joined them from the Crimean campaign, approached the Alan city of Minkas, which was besieged for 1 month and 15 days [14]. Some Aces also sided with the Mongols, for example, the brothers Batur, Matarsha and Utsorbugan, who besieged Magas, as well as the ruler of the Assa city Arslan and one of the major rulers of the Aces Khanhus [15].
Hanhus’ biography is very interesting here. His son Aktachi became a member of the kagan’s guard, Khanhus himself was killed in battle. His wife Wai-ma-si (Chinese transcription) pacified the rebels, and their son An-fa-pu (Chinese transcription) succeeded her in power.
According to Yuan Shi, the Mongols approached the capital of the Aesir Magas (Minkas) in the eleventh month (11/27/1239-12/26/1239), and in the initial moon of the following year (02/06/1240-02/24/1240) the Mongols took Magas. During the capture of Magas, Shiri-gambu tangut distinguished himself [16]. Based on two indirect dates, it can be assumed that the Mongols approached Magas no earlier than December 21-22, 1239, and took it no later than February 10-11, 1240. After that, the tsarevichs, having appointed an army, entrusted it to Bukdai and sent it to Derbent [17]. Quite an interesting question is when the quarrel between Guyuk and Batu took place. According to the SSM, this happened after the destruction of the city of Megheta at a farewell feast [18]. The phrase «farewell feast» and the fact that Guyuk, Buri and Argasun were about to leave may indirectly indicate the end of the campaign. It is worth adding that Batu sent a secret message to Ogedei, and shortly after that Guyuk came to see his father. Most likely, Guyuk did not come to the reception on his father’s orders, but immediately after the western campaign, considering his participation in the campaign completed, since all the original goals of the campaign had been fulfilled. Apparently, Guyuk, Buri and Argasun voluntarily left the army, since the de facto campaign was over, but this status was not confirmed de jure by the kagan. If we assume that the capture of Magas took place in February 1240, and the farewell feast in late February or early March, then Guyuk could have ended up at the kagan’s headquarters, having voluntarily left the army in May. For example, William Rubruk’s trip from Batu to Karakorum took 2 months and 10 days [19].
Ogedei received news from Batu about Guyuk’s unauthorized departure. Ogedei was very angry with him and sent Guyuk and Argasun to Batu’s court, and Buri to Chagatai’s court [20]. Apparently both of them, and later Storms, came to Batu, who justified them, not wanting to spoil relations with his uncles. In the autumn of 1240, Guyuk and Mengu were recalled from the Western Campaign [8, 91]. R.P. Khrapachevsky believes that the withdrawal of Guyuk and Mengu’s troops took place after the capture of Vladimir-Volynsky [21]. It is quite possible that the recall occurred during the siege of Kiev, since during the siege of Kiev, chroniclers recorded both in the Mongol army [22]. Based on this hypothesis, Rashid al-Din’s lack of tsarevich data in the war against the black hoods and the capture of Mankerman can be explained. Thus, in November 1240, Mengu and Guyuk were still in the Batu army, but in the same month they received Ogedei’s decree on the withdrawal of their troops [23]. Yuan Shi indirectly indicates that some of the troops were removed from the western campaign: «Next year (1241), the troops were recalled for rest and replenishment.» In addition, some of the new vassals, such as the Aesir Nikolai, Aktachi, Ilya-Batur and his son Uvash, Petros, Urdamur [24], were recalled to Mongolia and subsequently began to serve the Mongol khagans directly. At the same time, Banducha, the father of Tutuk and grandson of Inalchuk Kair Khan, came to Mongolia with Mengu Timur. In the continuation of the western campaign in Yuan Shi, in addition to the usual names, there turns out to be a certain Xu-li-wu, whom R.P. Khrapachevsky identifies with Hulagu [25]. Such an identification seems far-fetched to us, if Hulagu had participated in the campaign, then Rashid al-Din, the court courtier of the Ilkhans, and many previous authors would not have overlooked this fact. It is possible that this is a misspelling of the name of the Storm, who was an active participant in the Western Campaign, but was not mentioned in Yuan Shi. Buyget [26], who is identified with Bucek, is also mentioned among the participants in the continuation of the Western Campaign. Speaking about the number of Mongol troops, it can be assumed that after all the campaigns and the withdrawal of part of the troops to Mongolia, there were about 40 thousand soldiers at Batu. Of these, one tumen, led by Ordu and Baydar, participated in military operations in Poland, one detachment (the number of this detachment is about 5,000) under the leadership of Kadan and Buri fought against the Germans, another Bucek detachment (the number of this detachment is about 5,000) marched through Wallachia. As a result, there were about two tumen troops under Batu’s leadership. According to Juveini and Rashid al-Din, who depended on him, the Hungarian army was twice as large as the Mongol army. If we assume that the Mongols were about 20 thousand, then the Hungarian army could be about 40 thousand. Therefore, the fears of Batu, who did not want to engage in battle with a more numerous opponent, were understandable. As Rubruk wrote, in 1255-1256, the Hungarian army was about 30 thousand. It is quite possible that 13 years before, at the time of the greatest danger, it was equal to 40 thousand soldiers.
The most difficult opponent of the Mongols were the Kipchaks, against whom the primary military actions were directed, which lasted until 1240. Despite their bravery, heroism and steadfastness, the scattered Kipchak tribes could not defend their native land. A significant part of the Kipchaks retreated to the territory of Eastern Europe. The Kipchak khan Kotyan from the Durut clan, along with 40 thousand tribes subordinate to him, went to the territory of modern Hungary, where he married his daughter to the Hungarian king. The descendants of the Kipchaks in Hungary are called Kuns and live in separate ethnographic regions of Nagy Kunshag and Kish Kunshag (Greater and Lesser Kipchak). As V.P. Kostyukov noted, the Mongols pursued a policy of purposefully destroying both the Kipchak nobility and any attempts by the Kipchaks to resist them. If the Kipchaks did not obey the new masters of the steppe, they were destroyed, and their children were sold into slavery in Egypt and the Middle East, where they formed the Mamluk military class. By 1250, the Mamluks were able to seize power in the country, overthrowing the previous dynasty. It was the Mamluks in 1260, under the command of Kutuz (Berke’s maternal cousin) and Baybars, who defeated the Mongol army at Ain Jalut and stopped the conquest of the Genghisids.
The Genghisid military campaign to conquer Eastern Europe ended in early 1242 due to the death of the great Khan Ogedei. The most likely heir was Guyuk, who had a very bad relationship with Batu. As a result, Batu decided not to exterminate the Kipchaks, but rather to attract them to his army in order to replenish it for a potential conflict with Guyuk. Many Kipchaks began to return to their native steppes. Plano Carpini, who spoke about the plight of the Kipchaks, noted that «quite a lot of those who fled return to them (the Mongols).»
Batu subjugated vast territories in Eastern Europe and turned many local peoples into his tributaries. For convenience and fearing a military clash with Guyuk, Batu decided to place the center of his ulus on the shore. Volga, where the construction of a new city, called Sarai, began. Batu reformed the administrative and territorial structure of the Jochi ulus. Most researchers note that after the Western Campaign, Batu made a number of changes in the administrative and territorial structure of the Jochi ulus related to territorial acquisitions as a result of conquests during the Western Campaign. As R.Y. Pochekaev wrote, «After returning to the Volga, Batu redistributed his possessions in the Jochi Ulus. First of all, it affected the redistribution of land in connection with the significant expansion of the territory of the ulus. Now the heir of Jochi himself decided which of the relatives deserved which inheritance, moreover, taking into account the newly acquired lands in the West» [27]. Most historians state only the fact of these changes, without analyzing the causes (apart from the expansion of the territory), the main elements and consequences.
In order to understand what changes have taken place, it is necessary to understand exactly what the structure of the Jochi ulus was before the Western Campaign. After Jochi’s death, his ulus was actually divided between two co-rulers Batu and Orda Edgen. Such a co-government was beneficial to the central authorities. As Utemysh-hadji wrote: «[Genghis]Khan was moved by these words, remembered his son Yochi Khan, shed tears, gave them both even greater praise and said: «Tomorrow [we] will consult with the beks and give you an answer.» The next morning, having held a council with the beks, [Genghis Khan], in accordance with the khan’s yasa, gave Sain Khan the right wing with vilayets on the Idil River, [and] gave the left wing with vilayets along the Syr River to Ijan.» An interesting fact is that medieval Turkmens were divided into two structural divisions: Sain Khan (soyin-khan, soyin-eli) and esen Khan (esen-ili). Here, most researchers agree that Sain Khan is Batu and the Sainkhan Turkmens are the Turkmens who obeyed Batu in the 13th century. As for the identity of Esen Khan, it was only suggested that this was the name of Oguz Khan. In our opinion, the name Esen Khan hides Orda-ejen, who received control of a part of the Turkmens who were part of the Jochi ulus. The other part was taken over by Batu. This happened after Jochi’s death and the division of his possessions between the brothers. Another way to identify Esen Khan would be to try to identify him with Jochi’s son Isan, who was Du’s half-brother (either Ordu or Dukaji). But this option is less likely.
Thus, before the Western Campaign, the Jochi ulus consisted of two large parts: the right and left wings, which included the ulus of individual sons of Jochi. But, as we noted earlier, by the time of Berke, the Jochi ulus consisted of a center and two wings. The right wing was led by the descendants of Buval (there were such Shibanid uluses as Karaulak (Wallachia), Kyrk-Yer (Crimea), Julat-Cherkess (ulus in the Caucasus)), whose residence was Boz-Orda. The left wing was led by Orda-egen and his descendants. Their residence was Kok-Horde. The center was run by Batu and his heirs. Their residence was Ak-Orda. It is not entirely clear how the administrative structure of the Jochi ulus changed, and it began to consist of three structural elements (right, left wings and center). In our opinion, this happened in the time of Batu, immediately after the Western Campaign. It is worth mentioning here the context in which the redistribution of uluses took place. During the Western Campaign, Batu had a big quarrel with Guyuk, Ogedei’s son, at a feast after the capture of Magas. Guyuk challenged Batu’s seniority at this feast, after which he voluntarily left for Mongolia. Ogedei, angry at Guyuk, put him on trial by Batu. After that, some time later, when the Mongol troops were taking Kiev, Ogedei recalled Guyuk from the Batu army. After Ogedei’s death, Guyuk had the best chance of becoming khan. At the same time, he remembered the humiliation he had suffered from Batu. In such circumstances, Batu had no choice but to prepare for possible military clashes with Guyuk. As V.P. Kostyukov wrote: «Batu apparently began preparing for a possible confrontation with Guyuk immediately after receiving the news of Ogedai’s death. The curtailment of the western campaign and the return to the Volga, the change in policy towards the Kipchaks, and the deployment of the Shiban ulus in the eastern part of the Jochid possessions indicate an awareness of the scale of the threat posed by Guyuk.» Kostyukov V.P. He notes that Batu changed his policy towards the Kipchaks: «Batu’s concerns about strengthening the military potential of his ulus after the end of the western campaign were expressed, among other things, in the fact that some of the escaped Kipchaks were allowed to return to their native steppe,» and also appointed his brother Shiban to the borders with the left wing for possible countering Guyuk and Orda ejen: «Given the challenges that Batu had to deal with, it is reasonable to assume that the main task of the Shiban corps was combat duty on the eastern borders of the Jochid possessions.» Thus, one of the main motives of the administrative reform of Batu was the preparation for the war with Guyuk. Therefore, changes in the administrative structure of the ulus had to be subordinated to this goal. As Kostyukov V.P. writes, Orda-edgen had a trusting relationship with Guyuk, that is, there was a crack in the relationship between Orda-edgen and Batu. And this fact should also be taken into account when reconstructing the main structural elements of the administrative reform of Batu.
It is worth mentioning here all the sources that mention the facts of Batu’s administrative activities after the Western Campaign.:
1. Abulghazi. According to this source, the Agen Horde received 10,000 families and Jochi lands. Shiban also received lands along the Irgiz, Or, and Ilek rivers in the north and up to the Chu, Sarysu, and Syr Darya rivers in the south. He also received control of 15,000 families from 4 tribes: Kushchi, Naiman, Karluk, Buirak. Moreover, Batu told Shiban: «The yurt in which you will live will be between my yurt and the yurt of my older brother, Eugene.» Here we can agree with V.P. Kostyukov that Shiban led the vanguard of Batu’s troops, which could clash with Guyuk’s troops. Most likely, Batu did not trust Ord’s half-brother Eugene, who had a good relationship with Guyuk. This distrust could spread to all the princes of the left wing. According to Rashid al-Din, they included the Edgen Horde, Udur, Singkur, Shingkum, and Tuka-Timur. Thus, Shiban, devoted to Batu, had to provide military defense on the borders with the Left Wing. The Shiban ulus comprised 15,000 families.
2. Mahmoud Ben Wali. According to Mahmud Ben Wali, Batu granted Tuk-Timur the region of Asov (vilayet-i as) and Mangyshlak. It is worth noting here that by the area of the Aces, most researchers mean ownership in the North Caucasus, where the Aces (Alans) lived. But it is also possible that this name hides the name of the city of Yassy (later it became known as Turkestan). In the first case, it would be unclear why the ownership in the Caucasus belonged to the left wing, in the second case, this contradiction is removed, since the city of Iasi was located just in the area of the borders of the Left Wing with the Batu possessions (center, former right wing).
3. Utemysh-hadji: «And so, when Sain Khan took possession of [all] these vilayets and these ells, he then distributed clans and tribes to all his relatives and assigned [them] lands and yurts. But when he consulted with his beks at the time when he gave Shayban Khan clans and tribes and gave vilayets, his beks said: «This man has done a very big thing. And now he’s getting cocky. It is not appropriate, having given him clans, tribes and vilayets, to keep [him] with himself. To the thirty thousand men [whom you] recently allocated to him, add more troops and send that man to the unconquered vilayets. Let any vilayet he subdues be his.» These words pleased [Sain Khan], he added to those allocated to [Shayban Khan] thirty thousand people, ten thousand more kiyats [and] yuraldai and sent [him], appointing him to the vilayets of the Crimea [and] Kaffa.» It is worth noting here that Batu, fearing Shiban, apparently decided to divide his possessions. Apparently, some of Shiban’s sons were sent to the West along with 10,000 kiyats of Burultai, who was Shiban’s tutor and, most likely, the son of Kuki Kiyat, who, together with Subotei, commanded a 30,000-strong corps of troops in the West of the Jochi ulus in 1229. Also, most likely, Shiban’s children played the role of amanats (hostages), whose presence under Batu’s control guaranteed their father’s loyalty. As we noted earlier in various articles, the rulers of the Shibanid uluses in the new right wing were the sons of Kadak, Baymanl, Majar, the sons of Shiban, as well as the grandchildren of Shiban: Toktimur, the son of Cherik, the son of Shiban, Kutluk-Timur, the son of Sailkan, the son of Shiban, Kutluk-Buka, the son of Bahadur, the son of Shiban. Thus, potentially about 6 of Shiban’s sons could end up in the right wing, under the leadership of Buval’s descendants as a result of Batu’s reforms.
Buval, in our opinion, was the eldest son of Jochi (Juveini, he is listed as the first son of Jochi under the name Bamhal before the Horde and Batu), but he died before his father, so he did not inherit anything.
4. Tavarikhi Guzidayi Nusrat-nameh.
«Among these [Jochi’s fourteen sons], Tangkut, Boal, Chimtai, and Sonkur were born from concubines. They followed Shiban Khan. Ejen was followed by Muhammad, Udur, Tuka-Timur, Sangum.» «Half of Jochi Khan’s army was with the Horde, half with Batu Khan.»
Here, apparently, the author described the right and left wings of the Jochi ulus, which appeared after the administrative reform of Batu. We see that Muhammad, Batu’s half-brother and, accordingly, his potential informant, a Singkur, appeared in the left wing, ceded his ulus to Muhammad, but received his ulus in the right wing. It is also possible that the author of Tavarikha Guzidayi Nusrat-nam confused Singkum and Shungkur, and in fact the ulus in the right wing received a childless Singkum, since we later see two of Shingkur’s children at the head of two uluses in the left wing.
As we can see, as a result of the administrative activities of Batu, a new right wing was formed, and the former right wing, subordinate to Batu, became the center. Accordingly, Batu has much more material resources under control than before the Western Campaign, when the resources of Batu and Agen’s Horde were approximately equal. Since Orda ejen was older than Batu, Batu tried to offset this advantage by appointing the children of Buval, Jochi’s eldest son, as the leaders of the new right wing. At the same time, half of the uluses in the right wing belonged to the children of Shiban.
As a result, Batu distributed the conquered vast lands and population among his brothers and increased his power. At the same time, his former co-ruler Orda-egen did not receive an increase in his inheritance. The two-winged system of the Jochi Ulus with equal rulers Batu and Orda-edgen was transformed by Batu into a more complex system with two wings and a center. Batu headed the center of the Jochi ulus. The right wing was allocated to the children of Buval, Batu’s older brother, who apparently died earlier. The rulers of the right wing were Mingkadar, Buval’s son, and later Nogai, Buval’s grandson. The left wing was led by Horde Agen and his descendants. Orda ejen was unhappy that he actually got nothing from the possessions in the West of the Jochi ulus (the exception was his son Kurumishi (Korentsa), who received an inheritance in the right wing). Therefore, when Guyuk ascended to the throne of the Horde, Ejen was one of those who supported him. Orda ejen lived until the reign of Mengu Khan, who also tried to set him against Batu.
Despite his formal subordination to the supreme Mongol khans, Batu did not bear the title of khan, but by virtue of his authority, he was actually a completely independent ruler of his ulus, while strongly influencing neighboring uluses. After the death of Batu and his son, the Jochi Ulus actually became completely dependent on the center of the Mongol Empire. Batu’s posthumous title was Sain Khan.
After the death of Batu, who, despite his enormous power within the Mongol Empire, was not a khan, a number of events took place in the Jochi ulus that prepared it for gaining actual (from the beginning of 1264) and formal (from the Talas Kurultai in 1269) independence from the Mongol Empire.